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Litigation Risk and the Optimism in Long-horizon Management Forecasts  
of Bad News and Good News 
Helen Hurwitz 
This study investigates the framework of how litigation risk affects management forecasting of bad news 
and good news differently, resulting in differential optimism in these forecasts. I argue that distinct stock 
price patterns following these two types of management forecasts expose them to differential litigation 
risk ex post. While optimistic management forecasts of good news attract lawsuits, truthful rather than 
optimistic forecasts of bad news are more likely to trigger immediate lawsuits. As a result, managers 
adjust the optimism in bad and good news forecasts differently to reduce litigation risk. Consistent with 
my hypotheses, I find that ex ante litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management 
forecasts but does not change the optimism in good news management forecasts, and the optimism in bad 
news management forecasts is higher than that in their good news counterparts.  In addition, I use RegFD 
as a natural setting to demonstrate how arguably exogenous shocks amplify this effect. It appears that 
litigation risk in the pre-RegFD period is not sufficient to affect management forecasting behavior, and 
my findings only exist in the post-RegFD period. Last, I present evidence that is consistent with investors 
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In this study, I investigate how litigation risk affects managers’ forecasting of good news and bad 
news differently, resulting in higher optimism in bad news management forecasts than their good news 
counterparts.1
Theory predicts that absent affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, managers will withhold 
bad news and release good news, but when there exists an affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, 
they will release either good news or news that is sufficiently bad (Trueman 1997). Trueman (1997) 
further shows that good news disclosures are expected to be more precise than bad news disclosures. He 
argues that bad news disclosures have both a positive effect of reducing the probability of a lawsuit and a 
negative effect of decreasing the firm’s stock price, therefore the manager balances these effects by 
choosing an imprecise disclosure. However, since there are only positive effects of good news, the 
manager prefers full disclosure. Consistent with this rational, Skinner (1994) finds that bad news 
disclosures tend to be qualitative while good news disclosures tend to be point or range estimates. Both 
studies are consistent with my hypotheses that bad news management forecasts are more optimistically 
biased than their good news counterparts. I further analyze how distinct stock price patterns following 
 This research question is important given that managers have incentives to forecast 
optimistically to gain favorable market valuations and that investors increasing rely on management 
forecasts to make investment decisions, especially after the adoption of RegFD.  
                                                 
1This study focuses on the optimistic bias of management forecasts, referring to forecast bias as optimism. Because 
no shareholder lawsuits allege pessimistic forward-looking information and damage claim generally excludes 
opportunity costs from potential shareholders (Francis et al. 1994; Palmiter 2002), investors are generally less 





these two types of management forecasts result in differential legal effects on them. In particular, I argue 
that optimistic good news management forecasts attract lawsuits, but optimism in bad news management 
forecasts helps to reduce rather than increase litigation risk. Surprisingly, a truthful revelation of bad news 
could trigger immediately lawsuits, especially when the magnitude of the bad news is large. 
 The current legal system encourages shareholders to file a lawsuit whenever a company’s stock price 
decreases suddenly and sharply enough, since such a lawsuit always results in the return of some fraction 
of their losses. Alexander (1990) shows that decisions at the motion to dismiss stage tilt toward permitting 
plaintiffs to proceed with their case, and thus are more likely to favor plaintiffs than would decisions after 
trial. Since a combination of factors make trial a practically non-available alternative for resolving 
disputes, regardless of the merits of the case, most cases are resolved through settlement.2
                                                 
2 These factors include extremely risk-averse defendants (directors and officers are usually named, along with the 
firm, as defendants), high potential damages such as reputational damage to defendants, hourly fees of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and agency problems in the class actions. In addition, liability insurance pays only for negotiated 
settlements but not for judgments after trial. 
  As a matter of 
fact, less than 5% of securities class action lawsuits are actually tried to judgment. Alexander (1990) 
further shows that the strength of a case based on merits has little or nothing to do with determining the 
settlement amount. Instead, these cases settled at an apparent “going rate” of approximately one quarter of 
the potential damages. Because the recovery from settlement depends only on the occurrence of a large 
loss during a short period of time and does not require proof that a securities violation has actually 
occurred, managers are more likely to forecast in a way that avoids sharp stock price declines or 





market responses around good news management forecasts increase the probability of sharp stock price 
declines/fluctuations, patterns that trigger lawsuits (Alexander 1990; Frankel 1995). Therefore, I expect 
managers to avoid issuing overly optimistic forecasts. On the other hand, a truthful forecast of bad news, 
especially large magnitude of bad news, could lead to an immediate sharp decline of stock prices, thus 
triggering lawsuits instead of reducing litigation risk. However, by issuing optimistic forecasts and 
gradually releasing bad news, firms might be able to avoid sharp stock price declines, thus avoid lawsuits 
altogether. As a result, litigation risk might actually induce managers to issue optimistic bad news 
forecast, thus increasing the optimism in these forecasts. My findings are consistent with my hypotheses. 
I find that litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts but does not change 
the optimism in good news management forecasts. There is also evidence that bad news management 
forecasts are more optimistic than their good news counterparts.  
This study contrasts sharply with Soffer et al. (2000), which finds that managers with bad news 
release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only 
release about half of their news. The differences in the two studies rest on different forecast horizons, 
which are associated with different management incentives. While this study investigates long-horizon 
management forecasts, Soffer et al. (2000) examines earnings preannouncements. Prior research 
documents that managers issue short-horizon forecasts to meet/beat analyst forecasts to avoid negative 
surprise at earning announcement date (Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki 2006). Soffer et al. (2000) find that 





attribute firms’ preannouncement strategies to firms’ goals of avoiding negative earnings announcement 
surprises. In contrast, firms are more likely to issue optimistic long-horizon forecasts to gain favorable 
market valuations, and are less concerned about meeting or beating market expectations due to the 
remoteness of earnings announcement date. How to extract capital market benefits while mitigating 
litigation risk is in the center of long-horizon management forecasts. Therefore, the two studies 
complement rather than contradict each other.  
In addition, I use RegFD as a natural setting to examine how arguably exogenous shocks amplify the 
differential legal effects on management forecasts of good vs. bad news. After the implementation of 
RegFD, investors, particularly institutional investors, increasingly rely on management forecasts to make 
investment decisions. The higher information content of management forecasts potentially generates more 
trades and stronger stock price responses around management forecasts. Combined with litigation threat 
from institutional investors, these factors lead to increased litigation risk on management forecasts, thus 
changing managers’ forecasting behavior. Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that the difference in the 
optimism of good and bad news management forecasts is only significant in the post-RegFD period. 
Before the implementation of RegFD, litigation is too low to affect managers’ forecasting of either good 
or bad news, and there is no difference in the optimism of these two types of management forecasts. 
Finally, I study the capital market implications of the relative optimism in good news and bad news 
management forecasts by examining both short-window and long-window market responses to 





indicating that short-window market responses to forecast news are complete for both good news and bad 
news management forecasts. Investors correctly perceive and react to the relative optimism in good news 
and bad news management forecasts. 
In terms of research method, I directly examine management forecast errors. I measure management 
forecast optimism as actual earnings (adjusted for unusual items) minus management forecasts.3
My research contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways. First, this study extends 
prior research on the role of litigation risk in shaping managers’ forecasting behavior. Most prior studies 
focus on how litigation risk affects a firm’s decision to issue forecasts (Skinner 1994, 1997; Kasznik and 
Lev 1995; Brown et al 2005). Rogers and Stocken (2005) examine how the market’s ability to assess the 
truthfulness of management forecasts affects forecast bias, but they do not examine the differential effect 
of litigation risk on the optimism in bad news and good news management forecasts. Nor do they 
examine the difference in the bias of the two types of management forecasts. This study extends their 
study in these areas. Given that firms generally release bad news to reduce litigation risk, my results are 
surprising. I find that ex ante litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts. 
 The 
more negative the forecast error is, the more optimistic the management forecast is. I measure forecast 
news as management forecasts minus consensus analyst forecasts over the prior 90 days. If the 
management forecast is greater than or equal to the consensus analyst forecast, it is a good news 
management forecast. Otherwise, it is a bad news management forecast.  
                                                 
3Actual earnings per share are extracted from I/B/E/S, and are adjusted for unusual items to be on the same basis 





Firms appear to issue optimistic bad news forecasts to reduce ex post litigation risk. Therefore, investors 
and policy makers should take extra caution when interpreting bad news management forecasts. Second, I 
use RegFD as a natural setting to demonstrate how arguably exogenous shocks amplify this effect. I 
expect RegFD to increase the litigation risk on management forecasts, thus modifying managers’ 
forecasting behavior. I find that the difference in the optimism of good news and bad news management 
forecasts only exists in the post-RegFD period, consistent with my hypotheses. So far, little research 
examines the effect of RegFD on management forecasts. Last, contrary to the conventional view that 
investors perceive good news management forecasts as more optimistically biased than bad news 
management forecasts, I find that investors correctly perceive and respond to the relative optimism in 
good news and bad news management forecasts.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops hypotheses; Section 3 describes the 
sample; Section 4 specifies research design and empirical proxies; Section 5 reports results; Section 6 
discusses robustness tests; and section 7 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis Development 






Managers have incentives to forecast optimistically to gain favorable market valuations for various 
reasons, such as job security, performance-based compensation incentives, or firms’ financing needs.4
However, the effect of litigation risk on long-horizon management forecasts could be different for the 
following reasons. First, managers have higher incentives to issue optimistic long-horizon forecasts, since 
 
However, their opportunistic behavior is constrained by litigation threat. Lev and Penman (1990) show 
that investors can verify management forecasts by comparing them to audited earnings reports. When 
actual earnings are released, there could be sudden stock price drops or fluctuations if the management 
forecast turns out to be optimistic. Alexander (1990) and Frankel (1995) show that investors are more 
likely to sue firms when there are sharp drops in stock prices or large stock price fluctuations. As a result, 
firms voluntarily release bad news to reduce litigation risk (Skinner 1994; Skinner 1997; Kasznik and Lev 
1995; Brown et al 2005). It is well documented in the accounting literature that short-horizon 
management forecasts are usually pessimistic in nature, as firms tend to walk down analyst forecasts to 
avoid negative surprises at earnings announcements (Matsumoto 2002; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 
2004). In addition, Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther (2000) find that firms preannounce all bad news 
before earnings announcements, since total abnormal returns are lower if they preannounce only part of 
the bad news. 
                                                 
4. This study focuses on how litigation risk affects management forecast optimism. Francis et al. (1994) find no 
shareholder lawsuits alleging pessimistic forward-looking information. Palmiter (2002) provides evidence that 
investors who do not own shares and incur opportunity costs due to stock price increases are generally excluded 






they can benefit over a longer period of time. They also have sufficient time to walk down market 
expectations as the actual earnings announcement date approaches. Second, operating uncertainty usually 
increases with forecast horizon, thus it is more difficult for investors to assess the credibility of long-
horizon management forecasts. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that managers’ incentives to issue 
optimistic forecasts increase with the difficulty that the market experiences in assessing forecast 
credibility. In addition, shareholder lawsuits based on earnings disclosures are typically brought under 
SEC rule 10b-5, which requires proof of the intent of misstatements. Operating uncertainty associated 
with longer horizons makes it more difficult for investors to prove intentional bias on the part of 
managers. Therefore, litigation risk might not deter managers from issuing optimistic long-horizon 
forecasts. 
Further, litigation risk could affect long-horizon bad news and good news management forecasts 
differently, mainly driven by the distinct stock price patterns following these two types of management 
forecasts. Figure 1 depicts four hypothetical stock price patterns following management forecasts. Case 1 
depicts the stock price pattern following optimistic good news management forecasts. The initial stock 
price reaction to good news management forecasts is usually positive, followed by a sudden stock price 
drop when the good news does not materialize at the actual earnings announcement or as the firm revises 
down its previous forecasts. Frankel (1995) and Alexander (1990) show that a sudden stock price drop or 
large stock price fluctuations cause lawsuits. Thus, optimistic good news management forecasts are 





reaction. Case 3 shows a smooth downward stock price trend associated with an optimistic bad news 
management forecast. An initial moderate decline is followed by a mild decrease in stock prices until the 
actual earnings news is revealed to be worse. By issuing an (or a series of) optimistic bad news forecast(s) 
to gradually walk down investor expectations, firms might be able to avoid sharp stock price declines thus 
reduce the likelihood of lawsuits. In addition, the partial release of bad news shortens the class period of 
the lawsuit, thus reducing the number of potential plaintiffs and legal damages. Skinner (1997) finds that 
more timely disclosure of bad news is associated with lower settlement amounts. In contrast, a truthful 
revelation of the bad news in case 4 could cause a sharp decline in stock prices, triggering an immediate 
lawsuit when the magnitude of the bad news is large. Skinner (1997) shows that stockholders sue when 
there is a large negative earnings surprise even though managers quickly disclose the bad news. Case 4 is 
in sharp contrast to case 2, where a truthful or conservative revelation of good news is associated with a 
smooth curve trending upward. For the above reasons, I argue that the distinct stock price patterns 
following good news and bad news management forecasts increase ex post litigation risk on optimistic 
good news management forecasts but reduce ex post litigation risk on optimistic bad news management 
forecasts. To our surprise, an optimistic bad news management forecast could actually be a more optimal 
strategy than a truthful forecast of bad news. 
In addition, in the case of lawsuits, it is more difficult for investors to prove intentional bias in bad 
news than good news management forecasts. Skinner (1994, 1997) show that firms preempt the market 





upcoming bad news makes operating uncertainty a legitimate defense of the optimism in bad news 
management forecasts, especially when forecast horizons are long. It is difficult for investors to prove that 
a firm knows the full magnitude of the bad news but chooses to partially disclose the news and it is 
difficult to prove when the bad news becomes known to managers. In contrast, as investors do not 
normally sue firms for withholding good news (Francis et al 1994; Palmiter 2002), there is no (or 
minimum) legal need to disclose good news. When managers are uncertain about the magnitude of the 
good news, the litigation risk of releasing good news outweighs benefits. Absent managerial incentives, 
rational managers would not release good news when uncertainty is high. Thus, investors naturally 
challenge managers’ motivations for issuing optimistic good news forecasts, rending operating 
uncertainty a pale argument. For this reason, it is easier for a firm to defend its optimistic bad news 
forecast than good news forecast if a case goes to trial. Although less than 5% of disclosure-related cases 
are tried, this argument lends additional support that managers are more prone to issue optimistic bad 
news forecasts. The above analysis leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts but does not increase 
the optimism in good news management forecasts.  
If as I predict above, optimism in bad news management forecasts reduces the likelihood of lawsuits, 
and it is easier for managers to defend bad news forecasts than good news forecasts when a case is tried, I 





expect managers to be more optimistic when issuing bad news forecasts, leading to my second 
hypotheses:  
H2: Long-horizon bad news management forecasts are more optimistic than their good news 
counterparts. 5
This prediction is consistent with other explanations documented in prior studies. Raedy et al. (2006) 
prove theoretically that for a given level of inaccuracy, analysts’ reputation suffers more (less) when 
subsequent information causes a revision in investor expectations in the opposite (same) direction as the 
analyst’s prior earnings-forecast revision. Managers could face similar dilemmas, or they might be 
concerned that their forecasts would damage analysts’ reputation thus affect their relationship with 
analysts, e.g., analysts could drop coverage of the firm. If Raedy’s theory holds for management 
forecasts, optimistic good news management forecasts are more damaging than bad news management 
forecasts. If the good news does not materialize, it becomes bad news when actual earnings are 
announced or when the firm revises down its previous good news forecasts. In this case, investors’ 
expectations change in the opposite direction as the news contained in the original management forecast. 
In the case of optimistic bad news management forecasts, news is consistently conveyed in the same 
direction, which is less damaging to managers’ reputation or analysts’ reputation if analysts use 
 
                                                 
5 Although the focus of this study is on forecast optimism, I acknowledge that firms do issue pessimistic forecasts to 
deflate stock prices under certain circumstances. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) indicate that firms guide analysts to 
issue pessimistic forecasts prior to option grants to gain favorable option pricing. Newman and Sansing (1993) argue 
that firms in more concentrated industries have greater incentives to issue pessimistic forecasts to deter entry. Since 
these pessimistic management forecasts tend to be bad news, absent them, bad news management forecasts could be 





management forecasts to update their own forecasts. In addition, career concerns can motivate managers 
to withhold bad news and gamble that things could turn around later on. Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) 
theoretically model how CEO’s career concerns affect his/her disclosure properties. They argue that the 
optimal disclosure is less than fully transparent, especially for bad news. Last, managers may incur other 
costs, such as a loss of wealth and reduction of bonus payments and option awards due to stock price 
declines following bad news disclosures. The survey data in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) show 
that some CFOs delay bad news disclosures in the hope that things may improve before mandatory 
disclosure dates. For the above reasons, I expect managers to be more optimistic in their bad news 
forecasts than good news forecasts, resulting in higher optimism in bad news than good news 
management forecasts. 
Despite theoretical prediction and survey results that bad news management forecasts are more 
optimistic than good news management forecasts, early empirical studies generally show the opposite. 
Jennings (1987) uses investors’ response to management forecasts followed by analyst revisions as a 
proxy for the credibility of management forecasts. He finds that investors react more to good news 
management forecasts that are confirmed by analysts than those not confirmed by analysts, consistent 
with a confirmation effect. However, he does not observe such a confirmation effect in bad news 
management forecasts. He thus argues that investors perceive bad news management forecasts as less 
biased than good news management forecasts. Williams (1996) finds that analysts refer to prior 





management forecasts, but they do not do so following bad news management forecasts. She concludes 
that bad news management forecasts are less biased than good news management forecasts. Built on 
psychological literature that finds the credibility of messages is related to the pre-existing conception of 
the bias of communicators, Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2003) argue that good news is inherently more 
biased than bad news due to the expected upward bias of management forecasts. They find that the market 
response to good news management forecasts is bigger when the good news is supplemented by a 
verifiable forward-looking statement, but they do not observe the same phenomenon with bad news 
management forecasts. They claim that bad news is always informative, but good news is informative 
only when supplemented by a verifiable forward-looking statement.  
However, recent research challenges this traditional view. Although Rogers and Stocken (2005) do 
not focus on the differential bias in good news and bad news management forecasts, their descriptive 
statistics of mean predicted and actual forecast errors of annual EPS show no evidence that bad news 
management forecasts are unbiased or even less biased than good news management forecasts. Therefore, 
the mixed results in prior research call for a systematic and direct examination of the bias in good news 
and bad news management forecasts. 
2.2 The Effect of RegFD on Management Forecasts of Good and Bad News 
Prior to the implementation of RegFD, firms can leak information to select analysts or institutions. By 
the time management forecasts are released, these analysts or institutions might have already learned the 





are less likely to trade on forecast news as they have already traded based on their private information 
before management forecasts are released to the public. Meanwhile, uninformed traders, mostly 
individual investors, are reluctant to trade on management forecasts due to their information 
disadvantage. The lack of activities from both informed and uninformed traders result in lower trading 
volumes and weaker stock price responses around management forecasts. Both effects reduce the 
likelihood of lawsuits as well as litigation costs in the case of a lawsuit. In addition, informed institutional 
traders are either affiliated to the firm or favored by the firm to have received or continue to receive 
private information, thus are less likely to sue for management forecasts. Consequently, the relatively low 
litigation risk on management forecasts might not affect management forecasting behavior during the pre-
RegFD period, and there might not be any difference in the optimism in good news and bad news 
management forecasts. 
RegFD prevents firms from releasing value-relevant information to select securities professionals. 
The reduction of information leakage increases the information content of management forecasts, 
potentially increasing trading volume and market reactions around management forecast announcements. 
In addition, since institutional investors no longer receive private information after the implementation of 
RegFD, they also rely on management forecasts to make investment decisions, and will sue firms for 
misleading forecasts. Cheng et al (2009) show that institutional investors are more likely to serve as lead 
plaintiffs, and securities class action lawsuits with institutional owners as lead plaintiffs are less likely to 





lead plaintiffs. All these factors lead to higher litigation risk on management forecasts after the 
implementation of RegFD. Johnson et al. (2001) and Baginski et al. (2002) show that legal environment 
affects management forecasting behavior. Indeed, Heflin et al. (2003) find that management forecasts of 
point estimates decrease while range estimates increase after the implementation of RegFD.  
For the above reasons, I expect RegFD to affect the optimism in management forecasts. In particular, 
I expect RegFD to affect managers’ forecasting of bad news and good news differently. Bailey et al. 
(2003) show that trading volume around earnings releases significantly increases due to the difference in 
opinion after the adoption of RegFD. It thus becomes especially important to avoid large negative 
surprises at earnings announcements in the post-RegFD period. One measure taken by firms is to walk 
down market expectations through issuing bad news earnings forecasts. Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang 
(2003) find that the number of management forecasts more than doubled after the implementation of 
RegFD, consistent with firms responding to RegFD by issuing more forecasts to reduce information 
asymmetry. In addition, higher litigation risk on management forecasts after the implementation of 
RegFD also increases managers’ incentives to avoid big negative surprises around management forecast 
releases. As I argue in Section 2.1, truthful forecasts of bad news could cause sharp stock price declines, 
thus triggering immediate lawsuits, especially when the magnitude of the bad news is big. A more 
optimal strategy is to release bad news but only partially. Keeping some optimism in bad news 
management forecasts and gradually walking down market expectations ensures a smooth pattern of stock 





optimism in bad news management forecasts after the implementation of RegFD. In contrast, optimism in 
good news management forecasts increases litigation risk. Thus I expect managers to be more cautious 
when issuing good news forecasts. Untabulated results show that stock price responses to good news 
management forecasts more than doubled after the implementation of RegFD. 6
H3a: Before the implementation of RegFD, litigation risk does not affect the optimism in 
management forecasts; after the implementation of RegFD, litigation risk is positively associated with the 
optimism in bad news management forecasts, but not that in good news management forecasts; 
 If the good news in 
management forecasts does not materialize, this stronger stock market reaction increases the likelihood of 
large stock price declines or fluctuations, which are documented in prior research to cause lawsuits. As a 
result, I expect litigation risk to have differential effects on good news and bad news management 
forecasts after the implementation of RegFD. I therefore hypothesize that: 
H3b: Before the implementation of RegFD, there is no difference in the optimism in good news and 
bad news management forecasts; after the implementation of RegFD, the optimism in bad news 
management forecasts is higher than that in their good news counterparts. 
2.3 Market Perception of the Optimism in Good News and Bad News Management Forecasts 
Some prior studies find that good news management forecasts generate weaker short-window stock 
price responses than bad news management forecasts, thus conclude that investors perceive good news 
                                                 
6 Untabulated results show that the market reaction to bad news management forecasts decreases after the 
implementation of RegFD. However, this finding could be due to firms’ response to the increased litigation risk on 
bad news management forecasts by pre-releasing some bad news through other channels such as press releases and 





management forecasts as more optimistically biased than bad news management forecasts (Hutton, 
Miller, and Skinner 2003; Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner 2007). However, asymmetric investor loss 
functions or the differential magnitude of the news in bad news and good news management forecasts 
could also cause asymmetric stock price reactions to the two types of management forecasts. Indeed, 
Kothari et al (2009) find that firms withhold bad news but leak good news gradually. They argue it is the 
leakage of good news thus lower information content in good news management forecasts that causes 
weaker market reactions to good news management forecasts. In addition, if investors perceive bad news 
management forecasts as more optimistic than good news management forecasts, they could also react 
more negatively to bad news management forecasts, since the actual bad news could be worse. In this 
case, a stronger market reaction to bad news management forecasts indicates just the opposite to what 
prior research believes. That is, it is the higher (not lower) optimism in bad news management forecasts 
that causes stronger market reactions to these forecasts. Therefore, it is inconclusive to study only short-
window market responses to management forecasts. 
For the above reasons, I study both short-window and long-window market responses to management 
forecasts to determine the market’s true perception of the relative optimism in good news and bad news 
management forecasts7
                                                 
7 Short-window market response is measured as the 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around management 
forecasts, and long-window market response is measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns from two days after 
management forecasts till one day after actual earnings announcements. 
. If good news management forecasts are less optimistic than bad news 





news management forecasts, I expect a short-window underreaction to good news management forecasts. 
This underreaction is corrected as new information becomes available or when actual earnings are 
reported. As a result, long-window abnormal returns should be positively associated with the news in 
good news management forecasts. Similar logic applies to bad news management forecasts. A lack of 
such an association indicates that short-window market reactions to management forecasts are complete 
and investors correctly perceive the relative optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts. 
If the market is efficient, I expect investors to correctly perceive and react to the relative optimism in 
good news and bad news management forecasts, leading to my fourth hypothesis: 
H4: There is no significant association between long-window abnormal returns and the news in 
management forecasts of either good news or bad news. 
3. Sample Selection 
The PSLR Act was passed on December 22, 1995. The safe harbor provision shelters managers from 
litigation arising from unattained forecasts made in good faith (Johnson et al. 2001). To mitigate the 
confounding effect of legal environment on management forecasting behavior, I restrict my sample to 
management forecasts issued after the passage of the PSLR Act. In addition, First Call has very limited 
number of management forecasts before 1995. My sample spans over the period between 1996 and 2009. 
Since this study focuses on long-horizon management forecasts, I examine management forecasts of 





earnings announcements. They are treated as short-horizon management forecasts and excluded from my 
sample.  
To increase test power, I include a firm’s first management forecast issued in the same fiscal year. 
Firms have higher incentives to bias their first forecasts for the following reasons: first, firms can benefit 
from favorable market valuations over a longer period of time by biasing up their first forecast; second, 
operating uncertainty is higher for longer-horizon forecasts, thus litigation risk is likely to be lower for the 
first management forecast than for revised forecasts. It is more difficult for investors to prove intentional 
bias when operating uncertainty is high. In addition, as actual reporting dates approach, firms tend to 
revise down their earlier optimistic forecasts to meet/beat analyst forecasts, thus revised management 
forecasts could be less optimistic or even pessimistic (Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki 2006). Nonetheless, 
absent management incentives, even the first management forecast should be unbiased. In addition, I 
restrict forecast horizon (defined as fiscal year end less forecast release date) to be less than one year. 
Management forecasts longer than one year could be subject to lower litigation risk, thus firms’ 
forecasting behavior and market’s reaction could be different. I exclude management forecasts issued 
after fiscal year end to avoid earnings preannouncements. To reduce the impact of extreme observations 
and potential data coding errors, I truncate my sample at the top and bottom 1% of management forecast 
errors.  
I obtain management forecasts from the First Call Company Issued Guidelines (FCCIG) database and 





forecasts, analyst forecasts and reported actual earnings to mitigate the loss of information caused by 
stock splits and rounding (Payne and Thomas 2003). I then extract cumulative split factor for shares from 
CRSP based on forecast or earnings release date, and split adjust the unadjusted data.8 Management 
forecasts, analyst forecasts and actual earnings in First Call and I/B/E/S are adjusted for one-time items, 
so they are on the same basis. Daily share prices are from CRSP, and other control variables are from 
Compustat. I exclude firms with share price under $2 at two days before management forecast release 
date to mitigate small denominator problems, as share price is used as a deflator for forecast errors.9
To examine the characteristics of management forecasts for firms that are involved in disclosure-
related lawsuits, I hand collect disclosure-related lawsuit data from Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearing House. There are totally 2,132 disclosure-related lawsuits with a filing date in my sample period. 
I then extract the management forecasts of annual EPS issued by these litigated firms during their 
litigation periods. To be consistent with the sample used in this study for management forecast optimism, 
I retain each firm’s first management forecast issued for the same fiscal year. Among these 1,849 
 I 
obtain GDP data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The final sample consists of 9,683 firm-years 
and 2,721 firms over the period of fourteen years between 1996 and 2009.  
                                                 
8 I use the estimated management forecasts (cig_est) given by First Call, but manually check the data for errors. 
When the estimated forecasts appear to be erroneous, I manually calculate the management forecasts based on the 
detailed data and coding in FC. I extract the cumulative split factor for shares from CRSP to achieve a better match 
between split factor and share price. The cumulative split factor in CIG is identical to the cumulative split factor for 
shares in CRSP in most cases, but is different in some cases as CIG updates its records more frequently. I thank 
Jeffrey Ng for pointing this out. 
9 This study includes utilities, transportation, and financial services companies. The exclusion of these regulated 





management forecasts, 1,297 management forecasts have at least one analyst forecast over the 90 days 
prior to the forecast release date. 
4. Hypothesis Testing 
Section 4.1 examines the relative optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts as well 
as the differential effect of litigation risk on good news and bad news management forecasts. Section 4.2 
investigates the role of RegFD in changing managers’ forecasting behavior. Section 4.3 studies the market 
perception of the relative optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts. Section 4.4 
defines and discusses variables used in this study.   
4.1 The Relative Optimism in Bad News and Good News Management Forecasts as well as the Role 
of Litigation Risk 
To examine the relative optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts and how 
litigation risk affects management forecasting of good news and bad news differently, I estimate the 
following models using cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions: 
      FE = Good + Litigation + Controls + ε                                                                                              (1) 
FE = Good + Litigation + Litigation×Good + Controls + ε                                                              (2) 
The models’ variables are defined and discussed below:  
FE, management forecast error, is calculated as actual earnings less management forecast deflated by 
closing share price two days prior to the management forecast release date. I use actual earnings reported 





earnings in I/B/E/S are adjusted for accounting irregularities not included in forecasted earnings. Good is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the management forecast is greater than the prior consensus analyst 
forecast, and zero otherwise. I use the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005) to compute 
litigation risk: 
Litigation = G (-5.738 + 0.141 × Size + 0.284 × Turn + 0.012 × Beta – 0.237 × Returns – 1.34 × 
Std_Ret + 0.011 × Skewness – 3.161 × Min_Ret – 0.025 × Bio_Tech + 0.378 × Computer Hardware + 
0.075 × Electronics – 0.034 × Retailing + 0.211 × Computer Software + ε)                                           (3) 
Where G(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, Size is the natural log of the average 
market value of equity, Turn is the average daily share volume divided by the average shares outstanding, 
Beta is the slope coefficient from regressing daily returns on the CRSP Equal-Weighted Index, Returns is 
defined as buy and hold returns, Std_Ret is the standard deviation of the daily returns, Skewness is 
defined as the skewness of the daily returns, Min_Ret is the minimum of the daily returns, Bio_Tech is an 
industry indicator variable equaling one if the firm is in the bio-tech industry (SIC 2833 to 2836) and zero 
otherwise, Computer Hardware is an industry indicator variable equaling one if the firm is in the 
computer hardware industry (SIC 3570 to 3577) and zero otherwise, Electronics is an industry indicator 
variable equaling one if the firm is in the electronics industry (SIC 3600 to 3674) and zero otherwise, 
Retailing is an industry indicator variable equaling one if the firm is in the retailing industry (SIC 5200 to 





firm is in the computer software industry (SIC 7371 to 7379) and zero otherwise. The above variables are 
measured over the calendar quarter prior to management forecasts.  
Since Rogers and Stocken (2005) only examines the period between the fourth quarter of 1995 and 
the fourth quarter of 2000, which coincides with my sample period prior to RegFD, I use their coefficients 
to estimate the litigation risk for my samples in the pre-RegFD period. I then re-estimate the model for the 
post-RegFD period with the securities class action lawsuit data from Stanford Law School’s Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse for the period between the first quarter of 2001 and the fourth quarter of 
2009. I use two sets of estimates because I expect RegFD to alter litigation risk associated with corporate 
disclosures.  
Model 1 examines the relative optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts. A 
positive coefficient on Good indicates that good news management forecasts are less optimistically biased 
than bad news management forecasts. Model 2 includes an interaction term of Litigation and Good to 
examine whether litigation risk affects the optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts 
differently. The coefficient on Litigation represents the effect of litigation risk on bad news management 
forecasts, while the sum of the coefficients on Litigation and Litigation×Good represents the effect of 
litigation risk on good news management forecasts.  I control for year effect and industry effect with the 
Fama-French 48-industry classification codes. 






Growth/Distress Factor. I use BM ratio to proxy for firm growth and financial distress. Skinner and 
Sloan (2001) find that the market reaction to earnings announcements, especially negative earnings 
surprise, is greater for high-growth firms. Therefore, it is especially costly for high-growth firms to give 
optimistic forecasts and then surprise the market with negative news at actual earnings announcement 
dates. Revising forecasts downward before earnings report dates could also be costly, as Matsumoto 
(2002) finds that high-growth firms manage earnings upward but do not guide analyst forecasts 
downward to meet targeted earnings. Therefore, high-growth firms might be prone to issue less optimistic 
forecasts. High BM ratio could also indicate that firms are financially distressed. Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) find that financially distressed firms are more likely to issue optimistic long-horizon forecasts. In 
either case, I expect a positive association between BM and management forecast optimism.  
Forecast Horizon. Several studies find that forecast errors decline as forecasts are issued closer to 
fiscal year end (Johnson et al. 2001). Rogers and Stocken (2005) show that the optimistic bias in 
management forecasts is positively associated with forecast horizon. Following Roger and Stocken 
(2005), I measure forecast horizon as the number of calendar days between forecast release date and fiscal 
year end. 
Capital Market Pressure. I use two variables to proxy for capital market pressure: institutional 
ownership and the number of analysts following a firm. Lang and McNichols (1997) find that institutions 
trade on earnings and the change of institutional ownership affects stock returns. Thus, managers have 





find that analysts tend to cover firms that subsequently do well. The fear of analysts dropping the 
coverage of the firm could motivate managers to issue optimistic forecasts to paint a favorable outlook. 
Operating Uncertainty/Information Asymmetry. The uncertainty in a firm’s operating 
environment poses challenges for managers to accurately forecast future earnings. I use three proxies to 
control for the uncertainty in a firm’s forecasting environment: 1) loss, a dummy variable for firms that 
experience a loss in any of the four fiscal quarters prior to the management forecast announcement; 2) 
analyst forecast dispersion, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by price during the 90 days 
prior to the management forecast; 3) stock return volatility, the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the 120 days prior to management forecast. Prior research documents that it is more difficult to 
forecast earnings for loss firms (Brown 2001), and higher analyst forecast dispersion usually signals 
forecasting difficulty. Rogers and Stocken (2005) argue that it is more difficult to forecast a firm’s 
earnings when its “true” earnings are more volatile, and volatility in a firm’s “true” earnings is positively 
associated with volatility in the firm’s stock price. These three variables also signal information 
asymmetry between managers and investors. Kothari et al (2009) find that information asymmetry 
motivates managers to withhold bad news. I expect greater information asymmetry to also provide 
opportunities for managers to bias their forecasts. 
Previous Cumulative Abnormal Returns. McNichols (1989) and Rogers and Stocken (2005) find 
that management forecast errors are correlated with previous cumulative abnormal returns. I calculate 





matched CRSP Value-Weighted Index over the period from 120 days to 2 days before management 
forecast date.  
Size. Bamber and Cheon (1998) show that firm size affects management forecasting behavior through 
the balance of forecasting costs and benefits. In addition, Alexander (1991) and Skinner (1994) show that 
litigation cost is likely to be a function of firm size. Since litigation threat is a main driving force of 
management forecasting behavior, size could indirectly affect management forecast bias. 
4.2 The Impact of RegFD on Management Forecasting Behavior 
The change in legal environment caused by RegFD could change the impact of litigation risk on 
management forecasting behavior, in particular, the relative optimism in good news and bad news 
management forecasts. To examine this effect, I examine models 1 and 2 for the pre- and post-RegFD 
periods separately. Management forecasts issued before October 23, 2000 are included in the pre-RegFD 
period and management forecasts issued after October 23, 2000 are included in the post-RegFD period. I 
include lagged real GDP change to control for macroeconomic changes around the implementation of 
RegFD. All other control variables are the same as those used in models 1 and 2.  
Alternatively, I could extend models 1 and 2 by adding interaction terms of Litigation, Good and 
RegFD (a dummy variable that equals one if the management forecast is issued after October 23, 2000, 
and zero otherwise). However, numerous interaction terms could reduce test power and make it difficult 
to interpret results.  





To examine short-window market responses to management forecasts, I estimate the following 
models using cross-sectional OLS regressions: 
CAR-1, +1 = Good + FN + FN×Good + FN_Large + Guidloss + UE + UE_Large + Earnloss + Size + 
BM + Retvol + Horizon + ε                                                                                            (4)          
CAR-1, +1 = Good + FN + FN×Good + FN_Large + Guidloss + Size + BM + Retvol + Horizon + ε  (5)                                                                                                
Model 4 examines the full sample. CAR-1, +1 is 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around 
management forecast releases. FN is management forecast news, defined as management forecasts less 
the prior 90-day consensus (mean) analyst forecast deflated by share price. FN_Large, large-magnitude 
management forecast news, equals FN if the absolute value of FN is greater than 1% and zero otherwise. 
Guidloss is a dummy variable that equals one if forecasted earnings is negative, and zero otherwise. UE is 
the unexpected news contained in the current quarter’s earnings that are announced concurrently with 
management forecasts, measured as actual earnings less the prior consensus analyst forecast. UE_Large, 
large-magnitude earnings news, equals UE if the absolute value of UE is greater than 1% and zero 
otherwise. Earnloss is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm incurs a loss in any of the previous four 
quarters and zero otherwise.  
When actual earnings are announced concurrently with management forecasts, investors react to both 
management forecasts and actual earnings. To remove the confounding effect of concurrently announced 





Standalone forecasts are management forecasts issued on a separate date from earnings announcements, 
while concurrent forecasts are those issued on the same day as earnings announcements. 
The following empirical proxies are used to control for other factors that could affect short-window 
market reactions to management forecasts: 
Large-magnitude Management Forecast News/Earnings News: To control for nonlinearity in the 
returns-earnings relation (Freeman and TSE, 1992), I include FN_Large and UE_Large to allow different 
slope coefficients for large-magnitude FN and UE. UE_Large is only included when examining the full 
sample. 
Loss Firms: Hayn (1995) finds smaller return response to earnings news for loss firms than for firms 
reporting profits, so I include Earnloss and Guidloss in my models. Earnloss is a dummy variable for 
firms with negative concurrently-announced earnings. Guidloss is a dummy variable for firms with 
negative forecasted earnings.  
Horizon: As forecast horizon affects management forecast bias, which could influence the market 
response to forecast news, I expect forecast horizon to indirectly affect the market response to 
management forecast news (Jennings 1987; Rogers and Stocken 2005).  
I also include size, BM, and Retvol (stock return volatility) in the models as control variables, as prior 
research finds that market reaction to earnings news is affected by firm size (Atiase 1985; Freeman 1987), 





To examine the market perception of the relative optimism in good news and bad news management 
forecasts, I also study long-window market response to management forecasts with the following OLS 
regression models: 
BHAR = Good + FN + FN×Good + FN_Large + Guidloss + UE + UE_Large + Earnloss + Size + BM 
+ Retvol + Horizon + ε                                                                                                        (6) 
BHAR=Good + FN + FN×Good + FN_Large + Guidloss + Size + BM + Retvol + Horizon + ε       (7)   
Model 6 examines the full sample and model 7 examines the standalone subsample. BHAR is buy-
and-hold abnormal returns, measured as buy-and-hold returns less size-decile matched CRSP Index from 
two days after forecast releases to one day after earnings announcements. A lack of significance of the 
coefficient on FN as well as the sum of the coefficients on FN and FN×Good indicates that short-window 
market response to the news in management forecasts is complete for both good news and bad news 
management forecasts and that investors correctly perceive and react to the relative optimism in good 
news and bad news management forecasts.  
4.4 Variable Definitions 
The following is a list of the variables used in this study: 
            FE = management forecast error defined as actual earnings less management forecast deflated by 
share price two trading days before management forecast announcements;10
                                                 
10 Actual earnings are EPS reported in I/B/E/S. For this database, forecasted earnings are generally estimated on 







  Accuracy = the absolute value of management forecast error;  
        Good = dummy variable equal to 1 if forecast news is non-negative, and 0 otherwise; 
 
      FN = management forecast news defined as management forecasts less the prior 90-day   
consensus (mean) analyst forecast deflated by share price two trading days before 
management forecasts; 
  FN_Large = FN if abs(FN) > 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 
    Guidloss = dummy variable equal to 1 if forecasted earnings are negative, and 0 otherwise; 
  Litigation = litigation risk, measured with the model in Rogers and Stocken (2005); 
     Horizon = the number of calendar days between the forecast release date and fiscal year end; 
           Size = the natural log of equity market value at the end of the prior fiscal quarter; 
            BM = book-to-market ratio defined as book over market value of equity at the end of the prior 
fiscal quarter of management forecast announcements; 
        Retvol = return volatility measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over prior 120 
days; 
           Loss = dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm incurs a loss in any of the prior four quarters; 
   Std_Af = analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
                   during the 90 days prior to management forecast announcements; 





                       announcements; 
      Instown = institutional ownership measured as the percentage of firm shares owned by 
                        institutions; 
               Qn = the nth fiscal quarter in which a management forecast is issued; 
BHAR-120, -2= buy-and-hold abnormal returns from 120 to 2 days before management forecast 
announcements, measured as buy and hold returns less size-decile matched CRSP Index; 
     CAR-1, +1 = 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around management forecast announcements, 
measured as buy-and-hold returns less the size-decile matched CRSP Index from one 
trading day before to one trading day after management forecast announcements;11
        BHAR = buy-and-hold abnormal returns from two days after management forecasts till one day after 
actual earnings announcements, measured as buy and hold returns less size-decile 
matched CRSP Index; 
 
            UE = unexpected earnings for the quarterly earnings concurrently announced with 
management forecasts, calculated as actual earnings less the prior consensus analyst 
forecast; 
           UE_Large = UE if abs(UE) > 0.01, and 0 otherwise; 
              Earnloss = dummy variable equal to 1 if concurrently announced earnings are negative, and 0 
otherwise; 
                                                 
11 When management forecast is released after normal trading hours, I reset the forecast release date to the following 





Lagged_GDPChg=the change of real GDP in the quarter prior to management forecast issuances; 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the distributional properties of management forecasts. Panel A reports the 
distribution of management forecasts by year. The average number of management forecasts released 
each year more than doubled after the implementation of RegFD, consistent with prior research that 
RegFD increases voluntary disclosures (Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang 2003). Approximately 54% of 
my sample contains bad news, while Kothari et al. (2009) find that 76% of management forecasts of 
quarterly EPS contain bad news. This evidence suggests that the horizon of management forecasts plays 
an important role in shaping managers’ forecasting behavior. Panel B shows the distribution of frequency 
that firms issue forecasts. About 34% of the firms issued only one forecast in the 14 years examined in 
this study and about 17% issued forecasts almost every other year. Panel C reports the distribution of 
management forecasts by forecast horizon. Approximately 66% of management forecasts are issued in the 
first fiscal quarter, and about 81% of forecasts are issued in the first half of a fiscal year. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. Variables are defined in Section 4.4. Bad news management 
forecasts are more optimistic (or less pessimistic) than good news management forecasts in all 
percentiles. The magnitude of bad news (mean -0.64%) is greater than that of good news (mean 0.37%), 
consistent with the finding in Kothari et al. (2009) that managers withhold bad news but leak good news 





forecasts (mean 0.0085, median 0.0058) than on firms issuing good news management forecasts (mean 
0.0077, median 0.0055). Abnormal returns are negative (mean -0.66% and median -1.7%) over the 120 
days prior to bad news management forecasts and positive (mean 4.9% and median 1.8%) prior to good 
news management forecasts. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns following management forecasts are 
consistently higher for good news management forecasts than for bad news management forecasts over all 
percentiles. Short-window market reactions are positive to good news management forecasts and negative 
to bad news management forecasts. For the standalone subsample, average 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns is -4.5% for bad news management forecasts, and 2.1% for good news management forecasts. The 
magnitude of market reactions to bad news management forecasts is on average 2.1 times of that to good 
news management forecast, consistent with the findings in previous studies that the market reacts more 
strongly to bad news than to good news. There is no significant difference between firms issuing good 
news and bad news forecasts in terms of size, BM ratio, the number of analyst following, institutional 
ownership, stock return volatility prior to management forecasts, analyst forecast dispersion over the prior 
5 years and the incidence of loss over the prior four quarters. In addition, there is no significant difference 
between good news and bad news management forecasts in terms of forecast accuracy and forecast 
horizon.  
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix. Forecast news is significantly positively correlated 
with forecast errors indicating that the more negative the forecast news, the more optimistic the forecast 





suggesting that bigger firms with more analyst following and higher institutional ownership are more 
conservative when issuing forecasts. Forecast horizon is negatively associated with forecast error, 
consistent with prior research that management forecasts become more pessimistic as they approach 
actual earnings announcement dates. Both short-window and long-window buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are significantly positively associated with forecast errors, indicating that investors immediately 
react to management forecast errors and management forecast errors continue to be corrected in the long 
run until the actual earnings are announced.  
Figure 2 depicts the median forecast errors of good news and bad news management forecasts over 
the 12-month period prior to fiscal year ends. The median forecast errors of bad news management 
forecasts consistently lie under those of good news management forecasts for the first three fiscal 
quarters, but cross over to lie slightly above those of good news management forecasts for the last fiscal 
quarter. In addition, during the last three months before fiscal year ends, the median forecast errors of 
both good and bad news management forecasts are positive, meaning that both types of forecasts are 
pessimistic in nature. The evidence indicates that long-horizon bad news management forecasts are 
generally more optimistic than good news management forecasts, although there is no significant 
difference in the optimism of short-horizon management forecasts of good news and bad news.  
5.2 Ligation Risks and Management Forecast Optimism 
Table 4, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the management forecasts issued by firms 





forecasts, 635 (48.96%) are good news management forecasts and 662 (51.04%) are bad news 
management forecasts. There does not appear to be any significant difference between the number of 
lawsuits associated with good news management forecasts and that associated with bad news 
management forecasts. Further examination of the characteristics of these management forecasts reveals 
that the mean (median) forecast error of good news management forecasts is -1.23% (-0.03%), while the 
mean (median) forecast error of bad news management forecasts is -2.07% (-0.19%). Bad news 
management forecasts are more optimistically biased than good news management forecasts. The 
difference is statistically significant at less than 1% level. This evidence is consistent with my expectation 
that firms are cautious not to issue optimistic good news forecasts and that good news management 
forecasts with similar optimism are more likely to be sued than bad news management forecasts. The lack 
of a significant difference in the frequency of lawsuits between firms issuing good news forecasts and 
those issuing bad news forecasts could be attributed to the adjustment in firms’ forecasting behavior. If 
firms change their forecasting behavior and issue less optimistic good news forecasts due to higher ex 
post litigation risk on optimistic good news management forecasts, the number of lawsuits associated with 
good news management forecasts would be reduced. Consequently, there might not be any ex post 
difference in the frequency of lawsuits associated with good news and bad news management forecasts. 
Panels B and C report management forecast optimism and the effect of litigation risk on the optimism 
in good news and bad news management forecasts. Panel B shows the univariate results of management 





bad news management forecasts. This difference is statistically significant at less than 1% level, 
indicating that bad news management forecasts are on average more optimistic than good news 
management forecasts.  
Panel C reports the regression results. In column 1, the coefficient on Good is 0.001 and significant at 
5% level, indicating that good news management forecasts are less optimistic than bad news management 
forecasts by 0.001 on average. The difference is approximately 17.5% and 24.7% of the mean forecast 
error of bad news and good news management forecasts respectively. Consistent with this finding, figure 
2 shows that the median forecast errors of bad news management forecasts lie under those of good news 
management forecasts for almost all forecast horizons. These findings indicate that bad news management 
forecasts are more optimistic than good news management forecasts. The coefficient on Litigation is 
significantly negative, suggesting that litigation risk is positively associated with the optimism in 
management forecasts, which seems surprising. However, a close examination in column 2 reveals that 
litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts only and does not change the 
optimism in good news management forecasts. Column 2 shows the regression results of the effect of 
litigation risk on the optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts respectively. While the 
coefficient on Litigation is significantly positive, F test shows that the sum of the coefficients on 
Litigation and Litigation*Good is insignificantly. When litigation risk increases from the first quartile to 
the third quartile, the optimism in bad news management forecasts increases by 0.082*(0.01-





All other variables in panel C have expected signs. Higher operating uncertainty/information 
asymmetry, proxied by analyst forecast dispersion, the incidence of loss in any of the previous four 
quarters, and stock return volatility, increases management forecast optimism. Firms with lower prior 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns issue more optimistic forecasts, consistent with the findings of McNichols 
(1989). The number of analysts following a firm is positively associated with the optimism in 
management forecasts, while institutional ownership does not appear to change management forecast 
optimism. Larger firms are less optimistic, consistent with prior findings that litigation risk is higher for 
bigger firms. BM ratios are negatively correlated with management forecast errors, indicating that low 
BM (high-growth) firms issue less optimistic forecasts, and high BM (financially distressed) firms issue 
more optimistic forecasts. The coefficient on horizon is significantly negative, suggesting that firms issue 
less optimistic forecasts when fiscal year end approaches.  Controlling for year and industry effect does 
not change my results. In addition, if managers’ forecasting styles are sticky, the standard errors of 
management forecasts across different years could be correlated. To improve the efficiency on the 
coefficients, I perform the same tests using clustered standard errors by firm. My results remain the same.  
5.3 The Effect of RegFD on Management Forecasting Behavior 
Table 5 reports management forecast optimism and the effect of litigation risk on management 
forecast optimism during the pre- and post-RegFD period respectively. Panel A shows the univariate 
results of management forecast optimism. For the pre-RegFD period, the mean (median) forecast error in 





0.72% (-0.04%). There is no significant difference in the mean forecast error of good news and bad news 
management forecasts, although the median shows a difference. For the post-RegFD period, the mean 
(median) forecast error in good news management forecasts is -0.35% (0.08%) while that in bad news 
management forecasts is -0.49% (0.02%). The difference is statistically significant for both the mean and 
median forecast error at less than 1% level. 
Panel B reports the regression results of the optimism in good news and bad news management 
forecasts as well as the effect of litigation risk on the optimism in good news and bad news management 
forecasts. Columns 1 and 2 report results for the pre-RegFD period while columns 3 and 4 report results 
for the post-RegFD period. The coefficient on Good in column 1 is not statistically significant, indicating 
that there is no significant difference in the forecast optimism between good news and bad news 
management forecasts during the pre-RegFD period. This evidence is consistent with the findings in 
Rogers and Stocken (2005), which examine only the pre-RegFD period. In addition, the coefficient on 
Litigation in columns 1 is insignificant, suggesting that litigation risk does not change management 
forecast optimism in general. Column 2 adds an interaction term of Litigation and Good to examine the 
effect of litigation risk on the optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts separately. The 
coefficient on Litigation remains insignificant, indicating that litigation risk does not change the optimism 
in bad news management forecasts. F test shows that the sum of the coefficients on Litigation and 
Litigation×Good is also insignificant, providing evidence that litigation risk does not change the optimism 





large to change the optimism in management forecasts for either good news or bad news prior to the 
implementation of RegFD. 
For the post-RegFD period, the coefficient on Good in column 3 is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level, indicating that good news management forecasts are less optimistic than bad news 
management forecasts. The difference in the forecast error of good news and bad news management 
forecasts is 0.1%, approximately 21% (29%) of the magnitude of the mean forecast error of bad (good) 
news management forecasts for the post-RegFD period. The evidence suggests that the greater optimism 
in bad news management forecasts reported in table 4 is mostly driven by the post-RegFD period. In 
column 4, the coefficient on Litigation is positive and significant, while F test shows that the sum of the 
coefficients on Litigation and Litigation×Good is insignificant. These findings indicate that litigation risk 
increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts, but does not change the optimism in good 
news management forecasts during the post-RegFD period.  
5.4 Market Perception of Management Forecast Optimism 
Table 6 reports the regression results of short-window market response to management forecasts. 
Short-window market response is measured as the 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns immediately 
around management forecast release dates. Panel A examines the entire sample of 9,683 management 
forecasts. To reduce the confounding effect of concurrent earnings announcements on stock market 
reactions, I also examine the standalone sample which includes only management forecasts that are issued 





coefficients on FN are significantly positive and those on FN×Good are significantly negative. The 
findings indicate that investors react more strongly to bad news management forecasts than to good news 
management forecasts, consistent with prior literature.  
Table 7 shows the regression results of long-window market response to management forecasts. 
Long-window market response is measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns from two days after 
management forecasts to one day after actual earnings announcements. Panel A reports the results on the 
full sample, while panel B reports results on the standalone subsample. The coefficient on FN is 
insignificant in both panels A and B, suggesting that long-window market responses are not associated 
with the forecast news in bad news management forecasts. In panel B, F-test shows that the sum of the 
coefficients on FN and FN×Good is not statistically significant. Since long-window market responses are 
not associated with the forecast news in either good news or bad news management forecasts, we can 
reasonably infer that short-window market responses to forecast news are complete for both good news 
and bad news management forecasts. That is, investors correctly perceive and respond to the relative 
optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts. If investors discount good news 
management forecasts because they perceive good news management forecasts as more optimistically 
biased than bad news management forecasts but they are actually less optimistic as documented in this 
study, there would be a short-window underreaction to good news management forecasts. This 
underreaction is corrected when actual earnings are announced or when new information revises investor 





long-window market responses and the news in good news management forecasts. The lack of such an 
association provides evidence that investors do not perceive bad news management forecasts as less 
optimistically biased than good news management forecasts as claimed in some prior research. 
In panel A, F-test shows that the sum of the coefficients on FN and FN×Good is marginally 
significant (at 10% level), indicating that there could be an underreaction to good news management 
forecasts. This finding is inconsistent with the results for the standalone sample. However, it could be 
caused by the confounding effect of concurrently announced earnings. If managers tend to give good 
news guidance when their current earnings are not good, the weaker market response to good news 
management forecasts contains investors’ negative reaction to the disappointing current earnings 
information. Therefore, the test on the standalone subsample is more reliable. We can reasonably claim 
that investors correctly perceive and react to the relative optimism in good news and bad news 
management forecasts. 
6. Additional Tests 
6.1 Management Forecast Accuracy and the Effect of Litigation Risk on Accuracy 
Absent management bias, there should be no directional difference between the forecast error of good 
news management forecasts and that of bad news management forecasts. The significant difference in the 
forecast error between good news and bad news management forecasts found in this study is sufficient to 
prove the existence of management bias. Nonetheless, I examine management forecast accuracy for any 





Forecast accuracy composes of both management bias and measurement errors. Certain firm 
characteristics affect measurement errors in management forecasts. For example, if firms issuing bad 
news forecasts have higher operating uncertainty than firms issuing good news forecasts, citrus paribus, 
measurement errors in bad news management forecasts could be greater than those in good news 
management forecasts. In this case, if bad news management forecasts are also more optimistically biased 
than good news management forecasts as documented in this study, accuracy in bad news management 
forecasts would be lower than that in good news management forecasts. The lack of such a significant 
difference in the accuracy of good news and bad news management forecasts suggests that bad news 
management forecasts do not have higher measurement errors than good news management forecasts, 
thus there is no significant difference in the nature of good news and bad news management forecasts or 
characteristics of firms issuing these two types of forecasts. I use OLS regressions in model 8 to examine 
the relative accuracy in good news and bad news management forecasts: 
Accuracy = Good + Litigation + Controls + ε                                                                          (8) 
Accuracy, defined as the absolute value of management forecast error, measures unsigned 
management forecast errors. An insignificant coefficient on Good indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the accuracy of good news and bad news management forecasts. 
Table 8, panel A shows the univariate results of management forecast accuracy. The mean (median) 
forecast accuracy is 1.23% (0.52%) for good news management forecasts and 1.27% (0.55%) for bad 





management forecasts is not statistically significant. Combined with my earlier finding of greater 
optimism in bad news management forecasts, this evidence suggests that measurement errors in bad news 
management forecasts are not greater than those in good news management forecasts. Therefore, the 
forecasting environment of firms issuing bad news forecasts is not worse than that of firms issuing good 
news forecasts. Panel B reports the regression results. The coefficient on Good is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that there is no significant difference in the accuracy between good news and bad 
news management forecasts, consistent with the univariate results shown in panel A.  
Panels C and D report results of management forecast accuracy for the pre- and post-RegFD period, 
respectively. Panel C reports the univariate results of management forecast accuracy. For the pre-RegFD 
period, bad news management forecasts are marginally less accurate than good news management 
forecasts. There is no significant difference in the accuracy between good news and bad news 
management forecasts in the post-RegFD period. Panel D reports regression results with column 1 
showing the pre-RegFD period and column 3 showing the post-RegFD period. The coefficients on Good 
are not statistically significant in both columns, indicating that there is no significant difference in the 
forecast accuracy between good news and bad news management forecasts during both the pre- and post-
RegFD periods.  





I examine management forecasts by fiscal quarter for the possibility that the differential optimism in 
good news and bad news management forecasts is driven by management forecasts released during 
certain fiscal quarter. I use OLS regression in model 10 to perform this robustness test.  
FE = Good+Q1+Q1×Good+Q2+Q2×Good+Q3+Q3×Good+Control variables+ε       (9) 
I decompose management forecasts by the fiscal quarter in which they are released. Qn is defined as 
the nth fiscal quarter in which a management forecast is issued. All other control variables are defined in 
section 4.4. 
Table 9 panel A reports univariate results. Bad news management forecasts are more optimistic than 
good news management forecasts for all fiscal quarters except the fourth fiscal quarter. This result is 
expected given that management forecasts of annual earnings released in the fourth fiscal quarter are 
essentially forecasts of quarterly earnings, which are more accurate and usually pessimistic due to their 
closeness to earnings announcements. Mean and median forecast accuracy show mixed results. No 
consistent evidence demonstrates that bad news management forecasts are less accurate than good news 
management forecasts in any of the four fiscal quarters.  
Panel B reports regression results. Column 1 shows no significant difference in forecast accuracy 
between good news and bad news management forecasts for all four fiscal quarters, indicating that there 
is no significant difference in the nature of good news and bad news management forecasts or firms 
issuing good news and bad news management forecasts. Column 2 shows that bad news management 





fourth fiscal quarter , when management forecasts are essentially short term in nature. The findings are 
consistent with the univariate results shown in panel A. Therefore, the differential optimism in good news 
and bad news management forecasts is not driven by management forecasts issued in any particular fiscal 
quarter.  
6.3 Robustness Check of Data Skewness 
As a robustness check, I also examine the optimism in good news and bad news management 
forecasts with the rank of management forecast errors as dependent variable. Untabulated results continue 
to support my hypothesis that bad news management forecasts are more optimistically biased than good 
news management forecasts. My findings are not driven by data skewness.  
6.4 Partition Sample by Stock Price Patterns Prior to Management Forecast Releases 
Firms with downward drifting stock prices could be facing higher operating uncertainty than firms 
with upward drifting stock prices. To minimize the influence of operating uncertainty on management 
forecast errors, I partition the sample by stock price patterns in the 120 days prior to management forecast 
release dates. I find that management forecasts are more optimistically biased and have lower forecast 
accuracy for the subsample with downward drifting stock prices compared to the subsample with upward 
drifting stock prices. However, within each subsample, both univariate and regression results consistently 
show that bad news management forecasts have higher optimism than good news management forecasts, 





These results again confirm my hypothesis that the higher optimism in bad news management forecasts is 
driven by managers’ incentives rather than other factors such as operating uncertainty. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, I find that litigation risk increases the optimism in bad news management forecasts but 
does not change the optimism in good news management forecasts. I attribute this finding to the distinct 
stock price patterns following bad news and good news management forecasts. While the stock price 
pattern following optimistic good news management forecasts attracts lawsuits, the case with bad news 
management forecasts is counter intuitive. It appears that optimistic forecasts of bad news reduces rather 
than increases litigation risk while a truthful revelation of bad news actually increases the chance of 
immediate lawsuits. As a result, managers opportunistically modify their forecasting behavior to reduce 
ex post litigation risk, causing bad news management forecasts to be more optimistically biased than their 
good news counterparts.  
Using RegFD as a natural setting to examine how arguably extrogenous shocks amplify this effect, I 
find that the differential optimism in good news and bad news management forecasts as well as the 
asymmetric effect of litigation risk on the forecast optimism in good news and bad news management 
forecasts only exist in the post-RegFD period. Litigation risk in the pre-RegFD period is too low to affect 
managers’ forecasting of either good or bad news.  
Finally, I study investors’ perception of the relative optimism in good news and bad news 





forecasts. I do not find evidence that investors perceive bad news management forecasts as less biased 
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Panel A: Number of Forecasts per Year
Year Bad News Good News Total
1996 97 84 181
1997 136 105 241
1998 214 154 368
1999 225 160 385
2000 236 211 447
2001 421 357 778
2002 372 509 881
2003 452 454 906
2004 521 476 997
2005 538 428 966
2006 563 449 1012
2007 555 388 943
2008 482 385 867
2009 420 291 711
5,232 4,451 9,683
Panel B: Number of Forecasts per Firm                                                                                









Panel C: Distribution of Forecast Release Date
Month Lag Bad News Good News Total
-12 1,216 980 2,196
-11 2,110 1,614 3,724
-10 268 198 466
-9 363 490 853
-8 188 209 397
-7 114 77 191
-6 273 281 554
-5 123 145 268
-4 140 65 205
-3 216 232 448
-2 97 89 186
-1 124 71 195
5,232 4,451 9,683





Variables Mean P10 Q1 Median Q3 P90 Std
Management Forecast Bias % ( FE) -0.457 -2.649 -0.707 0.036 0.460 1.216 2.319
          Bad News (n=5,232) -0.527 -2.822 -0.815 0.000 0.413 1.148 2.330
          Good News (n=4,451) -0.374 -2.448 -0.562 0.067 0.505 1.273 2.303
Management Forecast Accuracy % ( |FE|) 1.255 0.061 0.191 0.537 1.415 3.195 2.002
          Bad News 1.273 0.062 0.195 0.553 1.435 3.307 2.021
          Good News 1.233 0.061 0.186 0.520 1.396 3.098 1.980
Management Forecast News % (FN) -0.174 -0.871 -0.266 -0.022 0.121 0.445 1.192
          Bad News -0.638 -1.562 -0.627 -0.230 -0.079 -0.029 1.277
          Good News 0.371 0.009 0.047 0.143 0.384 0.863 0.792
Litigation 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.016 0.010
          Bad News 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.017 0.011
          Good News 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.008
CAR-1, +1 (Full sample) -0.003 -0.114 -0.047 0.001 0.049 0.104 0.103
          Bad News (n=5,232) -0.029 -0.150 -0.070 -0.016 0.027 0.072 0.103
          Good News (n=4,451) 0.027 -0.068 -0.021 0.019 0.073 0.133 0.095
CAR-1, +1 (Standalone subsample) -0.016 -0.150 -0.060 -0.004 0.044 0.093 0.116
          Bad News (n=1,928) -0.045 -0.196 -0.092 -0.022 0.023 0.068 0.119
          Good News (n=1,484) 0.021 -0.080 -0.026 0.015 0.065 0.122 0.101
BHAR-120, -2 0.019 -0.230 -0.113 -0.003 0.118 0.267 0.266
          Bad News -0.007 -0.244 -0.128 -0.017 0.094 0.218 0.246
          Good News 0.049 -0.209 -0.094 0.018 0.147 0.317 0.286
BHAR 0.006 -0.405 -0.200 -0.013 0.168 0.401 0.384
          Bad News -0.004 -0.407 -0.209 -0.022 0.157 0.378 0.382
          Good News 0.017 -0.404 -0.189 -0.005 0.183 0.425 0.386
Size 7.341 5.312 6.206 7.205 8.402 9.558 1.639
          Bad News 7.412 5.386 6.257 7.263 8.480 9.658 1.655
          Good News 7.258 5.251 6.145 7.137 8.285 9.439 1.617
Book-to-Market Ratio (BM) 0.451 0.140 0.243 0.388 0.589 0.824 0.328
          Bad News 0.452 0.148 0.249 0.391 0.590 0.813 0.314
          Good News 0.450 0.132 0.234 0.383 0.589 0.832 0.345
Return Volatility (retvol) 0.027 0.012 0.017 0.023 0.033 0.046 0.015
          Bad News 0.027 0.012 0.016 0.023 0.033 0.046 0.016
          Good News 0.027 0.013 0.017 0.024 0.033 0.046 0.015
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (Std_af) 0.059 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.031 0.072 1.876
          Bad News 0.075 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.031 0.073 2.548
          Good News 0.040 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.030 0.072 0.163
Loss Dummy (Loss) 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.490
          Bad News 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.492
          Good News 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.488
Number of Analyst Following (Analystn) 5.424 1.000 2.000 4.000 7.000 12.000 4.762
          Bad News 5.599 1.000 2.000 4.000 8.000 12.000 4.858
          Good News 5.218 1.000 2.000 4.000 7.000 11.000 4.638
Institutioinal Ownership (Instown) 0.573 0.000 0.349 0.656 0.842 0.967 0.331
          Bad News 0.580 0.000 0.364 0.663 0.846 0.972 0.330
          Good News 0.564 0.000 0.325 0.646 0.838 0.959 0.332
Horizon 272 109 243 318 334 343 91
          Bad News 275 106 246 319 335 343 92
          Good News 270 114 240 315 334 343 90
% indicates that the values are in percentage format.
N=9,683 Firm-Years








               
               
               
               
               
               
               
        
FE FN Litigation BHAR-1, +1 BHAR-120, -2 BHAR Size BM Retvol Std_AF Loss Analystn Instown Horizon
FE 1 0.005 0.007 0.129** 0.128** 0.322** 0.142** -0.167** -0.16** -0.057** -0.09** 0.029** 0.037** -0.059**
FN 1 0.005 0.297** 0.121** 0.010 0.08** -0.082** -0.108** -0.027** -0.046** -0.005 0.019 0.031**
Litigation 1 -0.009 -0.061** -0.012 0.534** -0.132** 0.108** -0.009 0.015 0.382** 0.013 0.114**
BHAR-1, +1 1 0.045** 0.015 0.006 0.007 -0.031** -0.010 -0.03** -0.004 0.000 0.072**
BHAR-120, -2 1 0.007 -0.015 -0.055** 0.067** 0.006 -0.012 -0.056** -0.029** -0.015
BHAR 1 0.019 0.017 -0.007 -0.031** -0.013 0.019 -0.018 0.015
Size 1 -0.323** -0.347** -0.03** -0.008 0.53** 0.151** 0.201**
BM 1 0.15** 0.039** 0.105** -0.143** -0.072** -0.044**
Retvol 1 0.006 0.078** -0.012 -0.083** -0.072**
Std_AF 1 -0.004 -0.013 -0.019 0.003
Loss 1 0.004 0.028** 0.058**
Analystn 1 0.021* 0.026*
Instown 1 0.124**
Horizon 1
*, ** Significant at 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Correlation matrices for the sample of 9,683 management forecasts issued between 1996 and 2009.





Panel A: Management forecasts issued by firms involved in lawsuits
Total number of disclosure-related lawsuits 2132
Lawsuits with management forecasts issued during the lawsuit period 1849
      Lawsuits with management forecasts issued during the lawsuit period that had 
      at least one analyst following over the prior 90 days 1297
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Forecasts of annual EPS 635 48.96% 662 51.04%
Mean Median Mean Median
Forecast Error -1.23% -0.03% -2.07% -0.19%
Forecast News 0.24% 0.10% -0.50% -0.11%
Panel B: Univariate Results (%)
Mean Median
Good News -0.374 0.067
Bad News -0.527 0.000
Difference:      
       Magnitude 0.153 0.067
   p-value    (0.0012) <0.0001
Panel C: Regression Results
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
(1) (2)
Intercept -0.001 -0.34 -0.001 -0.31
Good 0.001 2.00 ** 0.001 1.30
Litigation -0.080 -2.18 ** -0.082 -2.13 **
Litigation×Good 0.009 0.15
Size 0.002 7.02 *** 0.002 6.83 ***
BM -0.008 -10.54 *** -0.008 -10.54 ***
Analystn# -0.151 -2.54 ** -0.151 -2.54 **
Instown 0.000 0.10 0.000 0.11
BHAR-120, -2 0.010 12.30 *** 0.010 12.30 ***
Horizon# -0.028 -10.25 *** -0.028 -10.25 ***
Std_af -0.001 -5.03 *** -0.001 -5.03 ***
Loss -0.003 -6.62 *** -0.003 -6.62 ***
Retvol -0.165 -8.06 *** -0.166 -8.04 ***
Year Effect Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes
Observations 9,683 9,683
Adjusted R2 11.45% 11.44%
F Value 18.88 18.61
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
# indicates coefficients have been multiplied by 1000 for expositional purposes.
TABLE 4 Management Forecast Error
(1) FE = Good + Litigation + Controls
(2) FE = Good + Litigation + Litigation×Good + Controls
F-test : Litigation+Litigation×Good=0
             (p-value=0.22)







Panel A: Univariate Results - FE (%)
Mean Median Mean Median
Good News -0.522 0.036 -0.347 0.077
Bad News -0.720 -0.037 -0.490 0.016
Difference:      
       Magnitude 0.198 0.073 0.143 0.061
   p-value    (0.1034) (0.0007) (0.0053) <0.0001
Panel B: Regression Results of Management Forecast Optimism for Pre- and Post-RegFD Periods Separately
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.010 1.39 0.009 1.27 -0.001 -0.21 0.000 -0.03
Good 0.001 0.49 0.001 0.85 0.001 2.05 ** 0.000 0.65
Litigation -0.015 -0.31 -0.007 -0.14 -0.062 -1.43 -0.082 -1.77 *
Litigation×Good -0.090 -0.76 0.069 1.17
Size 0.001 1.46 0.001 1.59 0.002 5.96 *** 0.002 5.76 ***
BM -0.011 -4.80 *** -0.011 -4.77 *** -0.008 -9.74 *** -0.008 -9.80 ***
Analystn# -0.081 -0.57 -0.074 -0.52 -0.160 -2.43 ** -0.159 -2.42 **
Instown -0.001 -0.54 -0.001 -0.57 0.000 0.36 0.000 0.37
BHAR-120, -2 0.009 4.47 *** 0.009 4.38 *** 0.010 10.94 *** 0.010 10.93 ***
Horizon# -0.038 -6.65 *** -0.038 -6.67 *** -0.025 -7.83 *** -0.025 -7.84 ***
Std_af -0.031 -8.89 *** -0.031 -8.90 *** -0.001 -4.76 *** -0.001 -4.77 ***
Loss -0.003 -2.28 ** -0.003 -2.27 ** -0.003 -6.12 *** -0.003 -6.14 ***
Retvol -0.180 -3.75 *** -0.175 -3.63 *** -0.151 -6.10 *** -0.152 -6.15 ***
Lagged_GDPChg 0.001 3.32 *** 0.001 3.36 *** 0.000 -1.10 0.000 -1.10
Year & Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,520 1,520 8,163 8,163
Adjusted R2 17.88% 17.86% 11.44% 11.45%
F Value 6.42 6.33 16.74 16.51
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
# indicates coefficients have been multiplied by 1000 for expositional purposes.
Post-RegFD
Post-RegFD
TABLE 5 RegFD and Management Forecasts
Pre-RegFD
(1) & (3) FE = Good + Litigation + Controls
(2) & (4) FE = Good + Litigation + Litigation×Good + Controls
F-test : Litigation+Litigation×Good=0
      (p-value=0.41)
F-test : Litigation+Litigation×Good=0






TABLE 6 Short-Window Market Response to Management Forecasts 
CAR-1, +1=Good+FN+FN×Good+FN_Large+Guidloss+UE+UE_Large+Earnloss 
                  +Size+BM+Retvol+Horizon     
Panel A: Full Sample 
   
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 Intercept -0.025 -3.60 *** 
Good 0.023 8.26 *** 
FN 5.978 13.46 *** 
FN×Good -1.544 -6.81 *** 
FN_Large -3.625 -8.59 *** 
Guidloss 0.011 1.47 
 UE 1.189 2.66 *** 
UE_Large -1.139 -2.55 ** 
Earnloss -0.010 -1.80 * 
Size -0.001 -1.97 ** 
BM 0.013 4.10 *** 
Retvol -0.015 -0.21 
 Horizon# 0.081 7.39 *** 
    Adjusted R2 13.41% 
  F Value 125.95 
  Observations 9,683     
Panel B: Standalone Sample 
   
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 Intercept -0.038 -3.06 *** 
Good 0.024 4.71 *** 
FN 6.954 8.48 *** 
FN×Good -1.621 -4.00 *** 
FN_Large -4.421 -5.65 *** 
Guidloss 0.006 0.53 
 Size -0.001 -0.78 
 BM 0.027 4.47 *** 
Retvol -0.103 -0.80 
 Horizon# 0.086 5.01 *** 
    Adjusted R2 15.12% 
  F Value 68.53 
  Observations 3,412     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 






TABLE 7 Long-Window Market Response to Management Forecasts 
BHAR = Good + FN + FN×Good + Controls   
Panel A: Full Sample 
   
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 Intercept -0.070 -2.55 ** 
Good 0.011 1.03 
 FN 1.979 1.11 
 FN×Good 1.565 1.73 * 
FN_Large -2.562 -1.52 
 Guidloss -0.040 -1.36 
 UE 3.057 1.71 * 
UE_Large -3.069 -1.72 * 
Earnloss -0.003 -0.12 
 Size 0.006 2.30 ** 
BM 0.025 1.92 * 
Retvol -0.069 -0.25 
 Horizon# 0.046 1.05 
 
    
Adjusted R2 0.17% 
F-test: FN+FN×Good=0 (p-
value=0.0505) 
F Value 2.4 
  Observations 9,683   




 Intercept -0.095 -1.84 * 
Good -0.001 -0.03 
 FN 3.508 1.04 
 FN×Good -1.412 -0.85 
 FN_Large -2.376 -0.74 
 Guidloss -0.076 -1.54 
 Size 0.006 1.15 
 BM 0.025 1.00 
 Retvol 1.218 2.32 ** 
Horizon# 0.077 1.09 
 
    
Adjusted R2 0.12% 
F-test: FN+FN×Good=0 (p-
value=0.54) 
F Value 1.45 
  Observations 3,412     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 






TABLE 8 Management Forecast Accuracy 




 Good News 1.233 0.520 
 Bad News 1.273 0.553 
 Difference:       
          Magnitude -0.040 -0.033 
    p-value     (0.3244) (0.3375)   
Panel B: Regression Results 







  Intercept 0.008 3.58 *** 
Good 0.000 -0.39 
 Litigation 0.034 1.31 
 Litigation×Good 
   Size -0.002 -12.03 *** 
BM 0.011 16.66 *** 
Analystn# 0.000 4.84 *** 
Instown 0.000 -0.78 
 BHAR-120, -2 -0.005 -6.89 *** 
Horizon# 0.000 17.64 *** 
Std_af 0.001 5.31 *** 
Loss 0.003 8.65 *** 
Retvol 0.228 13.24 *** 
Year Effect Yes 
  Industry Effect Yes 
  
    Observations 9,683 
  Adjusted R2 19.17% 
  F Value 33.8     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 









TABLE 8 Management Forecast Accuracy 
Panel C: Univariate Results 










 Good News 1.113 0.353 
 
1.255 0.558 
 Bad News 1.304 0.471 
 
1.267 0.569 
 Difference:       
             Magnitude -0.192 -0.118 
 
-0.013 -0.011 
    p-value     (0.0802) (0.0692)   (0.7688) (0.8069)   
Panel D: Regression Results for Pre- and Post-RegFD Periods Respectively 















  Intercept 0.001 0.09 
 
0.004 1.32 
 Good -0.001 -1.12 
 
0.000 0.04 
 Litigation 0.006 0.15 
 
0.019 0.53 
 Size -0.002 -3.97 *** -0.002 -9.57 *** 
BM 0.015 7.91 *** 0.010 15.08 *** 
Analystn# 0.000 1.42 
 
0.000 4.48 *** 
Instown 0.002 1.03 
 
-0.001 -1.26 
 BHAR-120, -2 -0.005 -2.69 *** -0.004 -5.72 *** 
Horizon# 0.000 10.45 *** 0.000 14.50 *** 
Std_af 0.029 9.96 *** 0.000 5.08 *** 
Loss 0.002 2.06 ** 0.004 8.60 *** 
Retvol 0.154 3.75 *** 0.252 12.48 *** 
Lagged_GDPChg# -0.001 -3.53 *** 0.000 3.82 *** 




    Observations 1,520 
  
8,163 
  Adjusted R2 25.55% 
  
19.45% 
  F Value 9.54     30.42     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 







Panel A: Univariate Results (%)
Mean Median Mean Median
Q1 Good News -0.45 0.07 1.38 0.64
Bad News -0.58 0.00 1.39 0.63
Diff 0.13 ** 0.07 *** -0.02 0.01
Q2 Good News -0.42 0.06 1.31 0.54
Bad News -0.63 -0.10 1.34 0.63
Diff 0.21 * 0.17 *** -0.03 -0.10
Q3 Good News -0.12 0.10 0.87 0.33
Bad News -0.47 -0.03 0.96 0.34
Diff 0.35 *** 0.13 *** -0.09 -0.01
Q4 Good News -0.04 0.06 0.52 0.17
Bad News 0.02 0.04 0.57 0.19
Diff -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.02
Panel B: Regression Results
Accuracy = Good + Q1 + Q1×Good + Q2 + Q2×Good + Q3 + Q3×Good + Controls
FE = Good + Q1 + Q1×Good + Q2 + Q2×Good + Q3 + Q3×Good + Controls
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
(1) (2)
Intercept 0.007 2.89 *** 0.002 0.80
Good 0.000 0.15 -0.003 -1.73 *
Q1 -0.001 -0.29 -0.001 -0.37
Q1×Good 0.000 -0.28 0.004 2.40 **
Q2 0.000 0.01 -0.002 -0.64
Q2×Good 0.000 -0.26 0.004 1.92 *
Q3 0.001 0.78 -0.003 -1.64
Q3×Good 0.000 -0.29 0.004 2.06 **
Litigation 0.033 1.30 -0.039 -1.25
Size -0.002 -11.92 *** 0.002 6.59 ***
BM 0.011 16.69 *** -0.008 -10.56 ***
Analystn# 0.000 4.70 *** 0.000 -2.53 **
Instown 0.000 -0.73 0.000 0.18
BHAR-120, -2 -0.005 -6.89 *** 0.011 12.26 ***
Horizon# 0.000 4.35 *** 0.000 -2.49 **
Std_af 0.001 5.30 *** -0.001 -5.02 ***
Loss 0.003 8.67 *** -0.003 -6.58 ***
Retvol 0.229 13.26 *** -0.169 -8.09 ***
Year & Industry Effect Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 19.15% 11.44%
F Value 31.18 17.45
Observations 9,683 9,683
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
# indicates coefficients have been multiplied by 1000 for expositional purposes.
TABLE 9 Management Forecast Error by Fiscal Quarter
AccuracyFE
